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ABSTRACT 
Engagement, motivation and active contribution by digital 
volunteers are key requirements for crowdsourcing and 
citizen science projects. Many systems use competitive 
elements, for example point scoring and leaderboards, to 
achieve these ends. However, while competition may 
motivate some people, it can have a neutral or demotivating 
effect on others. In this paper we explore theories of 
personal and social norms and investigate normification as 
an alternative approach to engagement, to be used alongside 
or instead of competitive strategies. We provide a 
systematic review of existing crowdsourcing and citizen 
science literature and categorise the ways that theories of 
norms have been incorporated to date. We then present 
qualitative interview data from a pro-environmental 
crowdsourcing study, Close the Door, which reveals 
normalising attitudes in certain participants. We assess how 
this links with competitive behaviour and participant 
performance. Based on our findings and analysis of norm 
theories, we consider the implications for designers wishing 
to use normification as an engagement strategy in 
crowdsourcing and citizen science systems. 
Author Keywords 
Citizen science; crowdsourcing; gamification; competition; 
social norms; personal norms; normification 
ACM Classification Keywords 
H.5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.  
INTRODUCTION 
Crowdsourcing and citizen science projects face key 
challenges in engaging contributors – namely how to recruit 
them, and how to get them to make an active ongoing 
contribution. In a review of crowdsourcing literature, Doan 
et al. [9] categorise common approaches, including 
(amongst others) coercion, payment, intrinsic enjoyment 
and competition. In citizen science literature, Kim et al. 
[23] report the use of incentives, competition, entertainment 
and education to support ongoing engagement. Also within 
the realm of citizen science, Rotman et al. [40] report a 
complex network of factors at play, with initial scientific 
interest and curiosity moving towards a desire for 
attribution and acknowledgment over time. Within HCI and 
CSCW research more generally, gamification is an 
approach that has rapidly gained prominence as a 
motivational and engagement technique [8, 26, 52]. 
Deterding et al. define it as “using game design elements in 
non-gaming contexts” [8]. Elements can include point 
scoring, leaderboards, goal setting, questing, and artefact 
collecting. These gaming techniques have been applied in 
diverse domains including eco-feedback [13, 28], health 
and exercise [4, 7], image labelling [50], and service 
industries [20]. Gamification aims to increase the 
motivation of participants partly by engaging with 
competitive urges and partly by increasing intrinsic 
enjoyment in an activity. It has also been used to encourage 
paid crowdsourcing participants to perform tasks more 
rapidly and with greater accuracy, leading to higher quality 
data [11]. In this paper, we particularly consider those 
aspects of gamification focused around competition and 
achievement, which we refer to as competitive gamification. 
Though competitive gamification may motivate some 
people, there is evidence to suggest that it can have a 
neutral or demotivating effect on others. Nicholson [30] has 
argued that competitive gamification can reduce peoples’ 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to a given activity. More 
generally, Duffy and Kornienko [10] have found that 
encouraging competitive behaviour has the potential to 
reduce altruism. Our paper explores the possible negative 
effects of competitive gamification in greater detail, and 
considers an alternative approach, which we term 
normification. Normification focuses on ideas of collective 
engagement by a community, with individuals within the 
community each “playing their part”. Rather than 
encouraging competition, it encourages normalising 
behaviour where community members aim to emulate 
others in the community and behave similarly to them. 
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 Normification applies theories from psychological literature 
on social and personal norms [6, 39, 46]. Within CSCW 
research to date, norm theory has been applied to 
understand and influence the development of online 
communities. It has also received some attention in the 
context of persuasive technologies. In this paper we focus 
on the potential of normification to support engagement 
amongst participants in crowdsourcing and citizen science 
systems. Normification is not seen as a direct replacement 
for competitive gamification. Instead the paper considers a 
range of situations in which gamification and normification 
strategies may prove more or less effective, and how the 
two approaches may interact with, and complement, each 
other. 
Our discussion is grounded in a qualitative analysis of 
interview data from a pro-environmental crowdsourcing 
study called Close the Door (CTD) [28]. In CTD 
participants used mobile phone apps to collect data about 
whether shops in a city kept their doors open or closed in 
cold weather.  The study was designed to explore the 
effects of competition on participants through the use of 
leaderboards, badges and pay-for-results financial 
incentives. Whereas high performing participants were 
clearly motivated by competition, analysis of semi-
structured interviews with participants shows that may low 
performing participants were demotivated by competition. 
However, it also became clear that some participants, in 
particular those performing at a mid-level, were using the 
leaderboard in an unexpected way. For example, one 
participant stated the leaderboard “was an indication 
obviously on how much other people were using it and I 
wanted to make sure I was sort of in the middle or top half 
rather than the bottom end.” The CTD study did not make 
explicit use of normification strategies, however attitudes 
such as this indicate the potential for motivational 
approaches based on normification to encourage those who 
are not motivated, or indeed demotivated, by competition.  
This paper makes several contributions to CSCW research. 
It provides a review of three major psychological theories 
on the behavioural influences of norms. Following this we 
review the impact of normative theories on prior research in 
crowdsourcing and citizen science, and categorise the ways 
in which these theories have been used. We then provide a 
qualitative analysis of attitudes of participants in the CTD 
study. Three broad motivational/demotivational factors are 
identified: self-competition, other-competition and 
normalising attitudes. We consider relationships between 
performance, motivation and attitude and also assess our 
findings in terms of the theories of norms. Finally, based on 
findings from the study and our analysis of norm theories, 
we consider the implications and make recommendations 
for designers wishing to use normification in 
crowdsourcing and citizen science systems. 
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY CROWDSOURCING 
Depending on the key aims of a crowdsourcing or citizen 
science system, it may desirable to identify and maximise 
the contribution of key individuals. For example, Foldit 
[21] uses point scoring and leaderboards to motivate 
solving problems of protein structure prediction. The 
scientists and designers behind Foldit are interested in 
identifying a small number of high quality solutions, which 
warrant further exploration. Given the nature of the 
problem addressed (protein folding), the system benefits 
most from regular participants with some basic skills, 
which participants may have inherently, or which may be 
developed through ongoing interaction with the system. 
Competition and high-ranking status may be an effective 
means of promoting excellence in such a community. 
In many cases, however, the objective of crowdsourcing is 
to maximise the overall output of the crowd. Many such 
systems require less skill and involve rapid or widespread 
data collection and/or assessment. For example, GalaxyZoo 
[25] involves the rapid assessment and categorisation of 
photos of galaxies, while WhatsInvasive [15] involves the 
spotting and logging of invasive plant species. Competitive, 
highly engaged, high performing volunteers can provide a 
substantial contribution to such systems. However there is 
also significant benefit from engaging larger numbers of 
more casual or occasional volunteers. In such cases, if gains 
among high performers, induced by competition, are offset 
by a loss in performance or participation by the wider 
community, then competition may reduce the overall output 
of the system. As we will see in the CTD study, which 
aimed to maximise the overall contribution of unskilled 
volunteers, there is evidence that competition did 
demotivate lower-level contributors. The question therefore 
arises: what techniques can we apply to maximise the 
effectiveness of both high and low level contributors? The 
norm theories discussed in the next section have the 
potential to help in addressing this challenge. 
THEORIES OF BEHAVIOURAL INFLUENCES OF NORMS  
Theories of norms and norm activation have developed 
primarily within research on the psychology of behaviour 
change, often in the context of pro-environmental and pro-
health behaviours. Three major theoretical models exist for 
the role that different norms play in influencing the action 
of an individual: the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, 
the Theory of Normative Social Behavior, and the Norm 
Activation Model.  
The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct 
The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct [6] distinguishes 
between two kinds of normative beliefs that can affect 
behaviour. Descriptive normative beliefs are beliefs 
regarding what others tend to do in a particular situation. 
These can be used to guide behaviour as a heuristic and can 
affect the decision to adopt pro-social behaviour. For 
example, Nolan et al. [31] found a strong correlation 
between an individual’s descriptive normative beliefs 
regarding the energy conservation behaviour of others and 
that individual’s decision to conserve energy in their home.  
Injunctive normative beliefs are beliefs regarding what 
actions others approve or disapprove of, and again can 
 influence choice as to whether to engage in pro-social 
behaviour. For example, a householder may believe that 
their friends or neighbours approve of energy efficiency and 
disapprove of wasteful behaviour, and may thus be 
influenced to be more energy efficient in their own home. 
A person’s actions are affected by both descriptive and 
injunctive norms to varying extents, and research has been 
conducted to explore their relative strengths and 
interactions. Schultz and Khazian et al. [42] found that a 
message that linked both descriptive and injunctive norms 
was more effective in encouraging towel reuse at hotels 
than a purely information-based message. Schultz and 
Nolan et al. [41] found that descriptive information about 
average energy use in similar households encouraged a 
move towards the mean by both high and low energy users. 
However, when combined with an injunctive indicator – a 
smiley face for low energy use and a frowning face for high 
use – the increase in energy consumption by low energy 
users was reduced.  
Descriptive and injunctive norms can operate in opposition 
to each other. For example, Cialdini et al. [6] demonstrated 
that people are more likely to litter in an area that already 
contains rubbish than in an area that is clear. Hence the 
descriptive norm that ‘people tend to litter here’ reduces the 
effect of the injunctive societal norm against littering. 
Interestingly, Reno et al. [38] compared the effect on 
littering in a litter-free environment of the observation of a 
single person discarding something, and found the reverse: 
viewing someone littering in a litter-free environment 
reduces the probability of an individual littering themselves. 
The Focus Theory argues that the norms that affect our 
behaviour at any given time depend on which norms are 
salient in any given situation. There is also evidence that 
norms operate subconsciously. Nolan et al. [31] found that, 
despite the strong correlation between descriptive 
normative belief regarding energy efficiency and an 
individual’s decision, the behaviour of others was rated as 
the least important reason for their actions. 
The Theory of Normative Social Behavior 
With the Theory of Normative Social Behaviour Rimal and 
Real [39] built on concepts within Focus Theory. In 
particular they focused on injunctive norms and developed 
a model of how they operate. They argue that injunctive 
normative beliefs gain their weight either from threat of 
sanctions or from social approval – “because people 
important to them expect them to do so”. They also argue 
that the effect of such norms on an individual’s actions is 
influenced by two other categories of factors. Firstly, the 
individual’s perceived outcome expectations of engaging or 
not in an action – namely what subjective benefits or 
disbenefits they believe they will experience. Secondly, the 
individual’s group identity and the descriptive norms of that 
particular group: individuals aspire to a varying degree to 
behave like others within a given social group, and 
experience positive emotions when conforming to in-group 
norms. Hence an individual’s course of action is influenced 
by a combination of injunctive norms operating on them, 
their subjective perception of ‘outcome expectations’ of 
different courses of action, and a desire to conform to the 
descriptive norms of a certain social group. 
The Norm Activation Model 
The Norm Activation Model of Harland et al. [17] further 
extended norm theory by introducing the concept of  
personal norms – namely the individual’s feelings of moral 
obligation to engage in or avoid particular behaviours. They 
argue that injunctive norms and other factors affecting the 
actions of an individual are significantly influenced by 
these personal norms. In a study of self-reported reasons for 
choosing to use unbleached paper or not, they found that 
personal norms were a stronger predictor than attitudes 
towards the product (a form of outcome expectation). They 
also found that personal norms were a stronger predictor of 
use than beliefs that others approved of such use (i.e. 
injunctive norms).  
The Norm Activation Model aims to explain the way in 
which personal norms come into being over the longer term 
[46]. The model states that personal norms are activated by 
a combination of (1) Awareness of Consequences – namely 
an awareness of the benefits of success or cost of failure of 
the collective action; (2) Ascription of Responsibility – a 
sense that the individual is partly responsible for bringing 
about the collective action, and; (3) Outcome Efficiency – 
whether they believe that the actions individually and 
collectively taken will have some positive impact. The 
model was primarily developed and presented as a model 
for the development of pro-environmental personal norms. 
However, in a more general form it can be applied to 
arbitrary collective action problems – namely those 
problems where a set of individual choices can result in a 
collective benefit to the community, though each choice 
may have an immediate cost on the individual.  
As with our two other theories, the Norm Activation Model 
has been the subject of experimental investigation. For 
example, the interplay between personal norms and 
descriptive normative beliefs has been explored by 
Göckeritz et al. [14]. They observe that the impact of 
descriptive normative beliefs on the uptake of energy 
conservation behaviour is reduced when an individual is 
highly “involved” – namely they are consciously engaged 
with the issue and so have knowledge and strong personal 
norms around energy conservation. They propose that 
descriptive norms influence behaviour without conscious 
processing, while strong personal norms are associated with 
greater conscious engagement, which in turn weakens the 
influence of descriptive norms. 
Overview 
The theories described above, and the associated 
experimental work, explore the relative influence of 
different norm types in varying situations. Each theory 
prioritises different norm types and motivational triggers. 
The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct distinguishes 
 between descriptive and injunctive norms, and emphasises 
how environmental factors can make certain norms more 
“salient” at a given time. The Theory of Normative Social 
Behavior provides a more detailed model of the factors 
underlying the operation of injunctive norms in a given 
social situation. Finally, the Norm Activation Model adds 
the concept of personal norms, which when strong enough 
can override both descriptive and injunctive norms. It also 
provides a model for how personal norms become active. 
Later in the paper we will return to these theories to see 
how they can be used to explain the results of the CTD 
study. Prior to this, we consider the extent to which norm 
theories have impacted on HCI and CSCW research to date, 
and the ways in which have been used to guide the design 
of crowdsourcing systems. 
PRIOR USE OF NORMS IN CSCW AND HCI RESEARCH 
Within CSCW literature, norm theories have featured in 
research aimed at understanding, influencing and 
developing online communities. Postmes et al. [36] explore 
how norms regarding the use of email are socially 
constructed over time by groups of collaborating students.  
In addition, Postmes et al. [35] have found that online 
communities with a strong social identity can reinforce the 
effect of pre-existing norms, despite participant anonymity. 
In a lab-based study, Sukumaran et al. [48] demonstrated 
that pre-existing contributions in an online news discussion 
site affect the thoughtfulness of contributions made by new 
arrivals. With regard to the use of social norms in 
influencing the behaviour of online communities, Chen et 
al. [5] explore how they can be used to increase 
contribution to MovieLens. They explored the effect of 
sending social comparison information regarding the 
performance of an individual and the mean performance of 
similar individuals. They found it resulted in an increase in 
contribution by those below the mean, and a decrease by 
those above – a similar phenomenon to that observed by 
Schultz and Nolan et al. [41]. However, the increase by 
those below the mean was significantly greater than the 
decrease by those above. Furthermore, they found that those 
who expressed a competitive preference in a questionnaire 
(defined as valuing achievement over social popularity) 
were more likely to increase their contribution if below the 
mean, and less likely to decrease it if above. This insight is 
of particular relevance to the focus of our paper on the 
interaction between competition and normification. 
The design of an online environment can also influence the 
norms that develop or express themselves within it. Lea et 
al. [24] present a collaborative learning environment for use 
by students, which is designed in such a way to promote 
'team player' behaviour – mutually supportive coordinated 
contributions. It does this through the use of “collectivised” 
activities, which encourage a common group identity. 
Sukumaran et al. [48]  demonstrate the effect visual design 
has on a news discussion website,  with a more serious and 
formal style promoting more thoughtfulness of 
contribution. 
Research in persuasive technology, particularly in 
environmental contexts, has also begun to consider theories 
of norms. He et al. [18] include the use of norms in their set 
of recommendations for environmental persuasion, and 
several trials have incorporated consideration of norms into 
their design. Thieme et al. [49] consider how social 
monitoring can encourage injunctive norms around 
recycling, whilst Mankoff et al. [27] consider how social 
networking can develop community norms around 
environmental behaviour, e.g. greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction. Several projects [12, 34, 47] explore how social 
feedback can influence domestic electricity use. Finally 
[43] suggests that comparative social feedback can be used, 
not only as a means to influence behaviour directly, but also 
as ‘an inquiry instrument to discover opportunities to save 
energy’. 
In this paper we are specifically focused on the implications 
of norm theories for the design of crowdsourcing and 
citizen science systems. To determine the extent to which 
psychological theories of norms have been applied in this 
context we conducted a survey of prior literature. We 
extracted all papers from the ACM Guide to Computing 
Literature1 that include either “crowdsourcing” or “citizen 
science” as an author keyword. This yielded a corpus of 
538 papers. Within this, we identified all mentions of the 
substring “norm”, and categorised the way in which 
different papers used it. We filtered out those papers which 
only used the substring in the word “normal” etc., and those 
which used it in a statistical sense, to leave only those 
which referred to social or personal norms. Of the original 
corpus, we found that 12 (2.2%) discussed norms in some 
way. The ways in which they discussed norms can be 
categorised as follows: 
Emergence of social norms in crowdsourcing environments. 
Three of the papers [16, 33, 45] discuss how crowdsourcing 
environments result in the emergence of new social norms. 
For example, Starbird and Palen [45] observe the 
emergence of norms around retweeting behaviour of digital 
volunteers in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 
The incorporation of social norms in design of 
crowdsourcing environments. Two of the papers touch on 
the relationship between the social norms of a community 
and the design of a crowdsourcing environment they use. 
Wiggins [51] discusses how existing community norms 
within the birding community were reflected subtly in the 
design of leaderboards as part of the eBird system. Reeves 
and Sherwood [37] observe that design choices when 
developing a crowdsourcing application can affect the 
norms that emerge in a user community – either 
unintentionally or intentionally.  
                                                            
1 Though this corpus contains over 2M publications both within and 
outside of the ACM, we recognize that this cannot be considered a 
complete literature survey due to the interdisciplinary nature of 
crowdsourcing research. 
 The influence of social norms on reporting of motivation in 
crowdsourcing. Antin and Shaw [1] report on how social 
norms in different cultures can affect self-reporting of 
motivational factors in crowdsourcing. 
Social Norms as a motivational factor for participants in 
crowdsourcing and citizen science. Kim et al. [22] refers to 
social norms as one of several motivational factors for data 
collectors in citizen science, but does not explore it further. 
Nov et al. [32] conducted a survey on self-reported 
motivations of volunteers with stardust@home, and 
analysed the results to determine which factors were most 
salient. They found that collective and intrinsic factors were 
the most salient, with social identification and norm-related 
factors being secondary. Rotman et al. [40] explored the 
motivation of volunteers in projects making a scientific 
contribution and found a complex network of factors at 
play, with initial scientific interest and curiosity moving 
towards a desire for attribution and acknowledgment over 
time, but did not explore the role of social norms in this 
process. The only example in our corpus of work that 
attempts to actively use norm theory (along with other 
interventions) to affect behaviour is [44]. Shaw et al.  
explored the effect of a number of messages and questions 
on motivating qualitative coders in an online labour market. 
Among the messages, two were connected to social norm 
theory. For example, they attempted to activate an 
injunctive social norm encouraging good behaviour through 
the message “It is your job to provide accurate answers to 
these questions. It is important that you do your job well.”  
This was found to have no significant effect on job 
performance. This is an interesting finding, and one that we 
return to in our Discussion and Analysis section when 
considering the results presented in the current paper. 
Influencing of Social Norms through Crowdsourcing. Prior 
research with the CTD environmental campaign has 
considered two distinctive, but complementary perspectives 
on social norms and crowdsourcing. As previously stated, 
Massung et al. [28] investigated the use of different 
gamification strategies in supporting crowdsourcing of pro-
environmental data. The current paper extends that work by 
considering normification as an additional engagement 
strategy for volunteers in crowdsourcing projects. They [28] 
also considered, but did not investigate, a longer-term 
possibility. Namely, if crowdsourcing can support large-
scale environmental data collection, this data could then be 
brought to bear in influencing ingrained, negative social 
behaviour. The possibility of using crowdsourced data to 
influence third party social norms was discussed further in 
Massung and Preist. [29]. This is an interesting longer-term 
research goal, but beyond the scope of the current paper. 
This literature review has shown that whilst norms have 
received attention in the CSCW community more generally, 
they have received only limited attention as an active 
design strategy in prior crowdsourcing research. We now 
consider the CTD study in more detail. 
THE CLOSE THE DOORS STUDY 
Close the Door (CTD) is a UK-based pro-environmental 
campaign that encourages shops to reduce energy waste by 
keeping their doors shut when running heating during the 
winter. A detailed study of typical 150m2 UK high street 
shops found that keeping doors closed can reduce carbon 
emissions and the amount of heating energy used by 30-
50% [3]. The campaign operates across several UK cities 
and is lead by a core group of dedicated and highly 
motivated members. The aim of the CTD study was to 
investigate how mobile crowdsourcing could be used to 
increase the scalability of campaign groups like CTD by 
engaging and enabling casual, digital volunteers to collect 
relevant data. This approach has the potential to allow small 
campaign groups to collect data on a much larger scale than 
previously possible and also free core members to focus on 
advocacy activities. In line with Massung and Preist. [29] 
we believe large-scale data collection, and focused 
advocacy, will ultimately support third party change. 
Overall we developed three apps for the iPhone. As users 
went about their daily routines, the app allowed them to 
collect information about whether shop doors were opened 
or closed, with each app using a different strategy to try to 
engage and motivate the digital volunteers. The Virtual app 
used competitive gamification to encourage engagement 
through game mechanics including points, badges, and a 
leaderboard. The Financial app was similar to the Virtual 
app, incorporating the same competitive gamification 
techniques, but with the addition of financial incentives to 
encourage participants to carry out data collection tasks. 
The Control app did not use any explicit motivational 
strategies and so acted as a control. Control participants did 
not receive points or badges for rating shop doors, nor did 
they see the activity of other participants. Further details of 
the app design are available in [28]. 
Experimental procedure 
The CTD study lasted two weeks. 48 participants were 
randomly assigned to three groups, each using one app – 
Control, Virtual or Financial – with 16 participants per 
group. In all cases, participants were asked to record data 
on as many shop doors as possible while going about their 
normal routine. Control and Virtual participants received a 
flat fee for taking part. Financial participants received a 
share of a fixed pot based on the number of badges and 
points they earned. The pot size was chosen to ensure that 
the average earned by the Financial group would be the 
same as the flat fee in the two other groups. Quantitative 
data on the number of shops rated was collected for all 
participants over the two weeks. Qualitative data was 
gathered through semi-structured interviews with 18 
participants. These interviews explored participants’ 
reactions on the different motivational strategies used in the 
CTD apps, e.g. leaderboards and badges. Six interviewees 
were selected from each app group: the two highest, two 
mid-range and two lowest performers in the data collection 
exercise. 
  
Figure 1: Points scored by the 16 participants in each group in 
the CTD study [28]. 
Competitive and normative attitudes in Close the Door 
The initial purpose of the CTD study was to explore the 
effect of competition on participants, and the “leaderboard” 
was framed in this way. The quantitative results of the 
study are reported in [28]. Here we summarise those 
relevant to this paper. Figure 1 shows the points scored by 
the 16 participants in each group2. We found that virtual 
rewards (points and badges) increased performance over the 
control group, though not to a statistically significant level. 
Combining financial rewards with leaderboards led to a 
statistically significant increase in the amount of data 
collected. Z-score analysis of performance showed that in 
both the virtual and financial groups, those at the top of the 
leaderboard were relatively stronger while those in mid and 
low positions were relatively weaker than the control group. 
In the case of the virtual group, this difference could also be 
observed in absolute terms: though the top 4 participants 
notably outperformed the control group, this was offset by 
comparative underperformance by those at mid and low 
positions resulting in no statistically significant difference 
in performance between the two groups. 
During our preliminary analysis of the qualitative interview 
data we also noted that some participants in the CTD study 
related to the leaderboard in an unexpected way. They used 
it more as a means to see how their performance compared 
with the community in general – i.e. a way more in line 
with theories of social norms rather than theories of 
competition. This observation raised interesting questions 
regarding the role of competition versus normification for 
our participants.  
Building on this observation we now return to this 
qualitative data to assess/determine what attitudes people 
express towards the leaderboard, and present further 
analysis and results. Having presented our results we will 
begin our discussion and analysis by considering several 
inter-related research questions: 
                                                            
2 The Control app maintained a log of the shops ranked by participants and 
through this their effective points total; however, this information was not 
revealed to control participants. 
 Financial Virtual 
Low 
scorers 
Other-competitive (-ive) Normalising 
Other-competitive (-ive) Other-competitive (+ive) 
Medium 
scorers 
Other-competitive (+ive) Normalising 
Self-competitive & 
Normalising 
Self-competitive & 
Normalising 
High 
scorers 
Other-competitive (+ive) Other-competitive (+ive) 
Self-competitive & 
Other-competitive (+ive) 
Other-competitive (+ive) 
Table 1: The attitudes expressed by 12 interviewees, with 
respect to the leaderboard. Tags in brackets indicate the 
motivational impact (+ive or –ive) expressed in other-
competitive statements. All self-competitive and normalising 
statements were associated with positive motivational impacts. 
• How do participants describe the attitudes they hold as 
motivating or demotivating? How do the expressed 
attitudes and motivations link to actual performance on 
the leaderboard? How do these different attitudes 
interact with each other? 
Following this we will step back and consider the broader 
question: 
• What explanations do the three psychological theories 
of norms offer for the expressed attitudes? 
Method 
Of the 18 interviews conducted with participants of CTD, 6 
were with the control group who had no access to the 
leaderboard. We analysed the transcripts of the remaining 
12, tagging examples of language that reflected different 
attitudes to the leaderboard. We then sorted these 
statements into different categories of attitude, and used 
these to categorise attitudes expressed by the different 
interviewees. Next, we tabulated the results against 
participant group (virtual and financial) and score (low, 
medium, high). Then, based on this tabulation, we carried 
out a second pass of the qualitative data to identify other 
factors, which may explain ‘anomalies’ in the table. Finally, 
we returned to the six interviews with the control group  
and tagged any examples of statements that corresponded to 
the attitudes identified in other groups, to explore to what 
extent these attitudes emerged, even in the absence of a 
leaderboard. 
Results 
The analysis of language used by the 12 participants in the 
financial and virtual groups identified three broad 
categories of attitude towards the leaderboard: other-
competitive, self-competitive, and normalising. Table 1 
charts the attitudes observed in interviewee statements 
against participant group and scoring band. As can be seen 
some interviewees made statements expressing more than 
one attitude. In the case of other-competitive statements, we 
also record whether the participant described being 
motivated (+ive) or demotivated (-ive) by competition. All 
 self-competitive and normalising statements were 
associated with positive motivational expressions. 
Other-competitive: We define an other-competitive 
statement as one in which the interviewee compares their 
behaviour with that of others on the leaderboard, with an 
expressed wish to beat others and/or not be beaten by 
others. In some cases, particularly for high scoring 
participants, an other-competitive attitude was linked to 
engagement and positive motivation. For example, one 
interviewee [Virtual Group, High Scorer] stated: “I would 
check [the leaderboard] … to see if people were coming up 
near me and if they were then I’d be like, ‘Right, I’ve got to 
get on with it.’”  However, in other cases, it was 
demotivating and had a negative impact. One participant 
[Financial Group, Low Scorer] observed “I think the score 
board put me off a little bit. … after a few days I think 
people were on hundreds and I was trailing behind.” 
Interestingly, both of the low scoring participants in the 
financial group described how the competitive aspect was 
initially motivating prior to becoming demotivating. For 
example, one stating that “to begin with [the leaderboard] 
spurred me on and then after getting so far behind it felt a 
bit oppressive really”. This suggests that it may not have 
been competition per se, but rather poor performance in a 
competitive environment that was demotivating. 
There is an anomaly in our data that that can be explained at 
this point. At first sight the low scorer in the virtual group 
who described other-competition as positively motivating 
appears inconsistent. However at interview this person 
stated that they found competition motivating, but also 
revealed that they had left Bristol for much of the trial 
period, thus limiting their ability to accumulate points. 
Self-competitive: We define a self-competitive statement as 
one in which the interviewee used their score to monitor 
their own progress, but not in comparison with others or 
with regard to improving or maintaining a position on the 
leaderboard. For example, one participant [Financial Group, 
Mid Scorer] stated that they used the leaderboard “kind of 
competitive with myself like today I’ll do a few more than I 
did yesterday” and that the leaderboard was motivating 
through “seeing the numbers go up just for me more than 
seeing who was above or below me.”  Another interviewee 
[Virtual Group, Mid Scorer] stated that they were motivated 
by getting badges and that scoring points “helped me do 
more because I was like I want to get more.”  Interestingly, 
unlike other-competitive statements, all self-competitive 
statements were associated with increased motivation. 
Normalising: We define a normalising statement as one in 
which the interviewee used activity on the scoreboard as a 
guide to what other people were doing, with a view to 
following them or making a representative contribution. For 
example, one interviewee [Financial Group, Mid Scorer] 
stated that observing activity on the leaderboard “did make 
me go oh okay […] I should probably make sure that I 
make an effort to do it when I go out.” Another [Virtual 
Group, Mid Scorer] stated that they viewed the leaderboard 
as “an indication obviously of how much other people were 
using it and I wanted to make sure I was sort of in the 
middle or top half rather than the bottom end.” 
Other normalising statements were more complex. One 
interviewee [Virtual Group, Low Scorer] stated that the 
sight of activity on the leaderboard before she had actually 
begun using the app meant “I felt guilty that I hadn’t 
started using it so then I used it.” This low performer is an 
interesting case. She expressed normalising attitudes not 
towards the score, but towards the use of the app. Overall it 
appears that she was spurred on by the activity of others to 
do something, but felt no need to compare her score with 
others, or to make an average or high level of contribution. 
Our analysis of six interviews with the control group found, 
unsurprisingly, that these participants expressed no 
competitive or normalising attitudes. One of them did 
highlight the lack of feedback, in what appears to be a 
request for feedback to allow self-competition as a 
motivator: “There should have been a guideline to how 
many shops we recorded […] there was no incentive!” 
Discussion and Analysis 
18 interviews, including 6 with control participants, is not 
sufficient to warrant strong conclusions. However, based on 
our results we can make a number of observations and give 
initial answers to our research questions. We will begin by 
considering our research questions around participants’ 
stated attitudes. Following this we consider the insights on 
this provided by psychological theories of norms. We then 
consider our findings in light of prior CSCW research 
incorporating norm theories.  
• How do participants describe the attitudes they hold as 
motivating or demotivating? How do the expressed 
attitudes and motivations link to actual performance on 
the leaderboard? How do these different attitudes 
interact with each other? 
The results presented in Table 1 broadly show a pattern of 
low scorers having an other-competitive attitude linked to 
demotivation and high performers having an other-
competitive attitude linked to motivation. Many people with 
an other-competitive attitude were initially motivated, but 
ultimately became demotivated by competition. Hence it 
appears that demotivation occurs when a participant is 
other-competitive but falls behind and feels they cannot 
catch up with others. Taken together other-competitive 
statements by our participants, and their contrasting 
performance, highlight both the benefits and possible 
negative effects of other-competitive gamification. 
Mid performers in our study expressed a normalising and/or 
self-competitive attitude to the leaderboard, with three of 
the four mid-performing interviewees expressing a 
normalising attitude. Self-competitive and normalising 
attitudes were always associated in our dataset with positive 
motivation – though not always high performance or 
 positive emotion, as the quote referring to guilt above 
shows. We found no evidence that demotivation occurs in 
those adopting only self-competitive or normalising 
attitudes. Statements indicate that they remained motivated 
to act despite the emergence of significant high scorers. 
While two interviewees expressed both self-competitive 
and normalising attitudes, and one expressed both self- and 
other-competitive attitudes, no interviewees expressed both 
other-competitive and normalising attitudes. This indicates 
an inconsistency between other-competitiveness and 
normalising attitudes, suggesting they are unlikely to be 
simultaneously held by the same person. The fact that all 
four high scorers expressed an other-competitive attitude, 
suggests that a competitive attitude is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for high scoring, while a normalising 
attitude tends to encourage mid-range performance 
(corroborating the findings of Chen et al. [5]). 
More broadly, it is interesting to consider how the 
behaviour of those holding one set of attitudes affects those 
holding another set. As Figure 1 shows, mid range 
performers in the virtual group (who typically expressed 
normalising attitudes in interviews) actually perform less 
well than the mid range performers in the control group. 
This is likely to be because of interaction, through the 
leaderboard, with low performers who were demotivated by 
other-competition. Consider again the words of a mid-
performing virtual app user: “I wanted to make sure I was 
sort of in the middle or top half rather than the bottom 
end.” This statement emphasises a leaderboard position 
rather than outright scores. Interestingly, the leaderboard in 
the CTD app was presented as a list. It therefore highlighted 
positions, and it is the low scorers on a leaderboard that 
determine the score needed to achieve a mid-level position. 
Hence if those low on the scoreboard are demotivated by 
other-competition, and therefore score less, the required 
score to achieve a mid-level position is also reduced. 
Hence, even though normalising attitudes acted as a 
positive motivator, they may have actually resulted in 
reduced performance of mid-range participants. This is 
analogous to the findings of Schultz and Nolan et al. [41] 
with regard to energy usage and Chen et al. [5] with regard 
to online community contribution. It is possible that a 
different feedback approach, which emphasised the size of 
individual contributions or the mean contribution, might 
have had a different effect on normalising participants. 
• What explanations do the three psychological theories 
offer for the expressed attitudes? 
The theory of Normative Social Behaviour [39] suggests 
that injunctive norms act through desire for social approval 
from specific individuals or groups. Participants in the CTD 
study did not know each other and the leaderboard used 
pseudonyms, which enforced anonymity. It is therefore 
unlikely that this theory provides a strong explanation for 
results in our study.  
The Focus Theory and Norm Activation Model offer 
greater insight. One possible explanation for the expressed 
attitudes is as follows. Recall that personal norms [17] 
operate to encourage a behaviour that the individual 
believes is the “right” thing to do, based on their own self 
image rather than what they believe others will think of 
them. We hypothesise that two kinds of personal norms 
were at work in CTD. Some participants have a personal 
norm that encourages competition – “I must be one of the 
best in what I do” – while others have a personal norm 
around contribution – “I must contribute sufficiently and 
appropriately to this collective effort in line with what 
others do”. In other words, a personal norm that follows a 
descriptive norm of what others contribute. Some, perhaps 
most, people have both contributory and competitive 
personal norms to a greater or lesser extent, yet which one 
is activated will depend on which is given salience in the 
specific environment [6].  
Our leaderboard and badges environment provided 
primarily competitive cues, and thus likely reduced 
activation of normalising motivations in users. However, it 
was (unintentionally) structured in such a way that those 
with strong personal norms towards contribution could use 
it in a normalising manner. In such cases, the leaderboard 
provided a representation of what others were doing, 
allowing individuals to form a descriptive norm of what a 
typical contribution was and therefore what they should aim 
for. So, for those with significantly stronger personal norm 
of contribution over competition, this descriptive norm of 
collective activity would activate their personal norm, 
resulting in the observed behaviour. 
This finding is consistent with the observations of 
Sukurman et al. [48] that the environmental cues provided 
by an online system affect which behavioural norms are 
made salient to its users. Our findings are less consistent 
with Shaw et al.’s findings about the use of incentives with 
inexpert human raters [44]. They found that an injunctive 
norm statement, “It is your job to provide accurate answers 
to these questions. It is important that you do your job 
well.” had no significant effect on job performance when 
sent to paid contributors in a crowdsourcing system, 
suggesting it did not motivate them. This approach is very 
different from ours – where individuals are able to discern 
norms from the leaderboard rather than being explicitly 
ordered to obey them – which may explain the difference in 
reported motivation. 
As noted earlier, Nolan et al. [31] found that social norms 
were not explicitly stated as a motivator in interviews with 
householders, even though they were found to be a strong 
predictor of energy efficiency behaviour. Why our approach 
to interviewing did identify the role of normalising 
behaviour where theirs did not is a subject for further 
exploration. One possible explanation is the structure of our 
interview: the role of social norms emerged when 
participants were questioned about their feelings about the 
 leaderboard, not about their motivation for participation. 
Those expressing normalising attitudes when talking about 
the leaderboard would give other explanations of their 
motivations to use the app – for example “I enjoyed doing 
it.  When I went places I suddenly went ‘Hey, I could use 
the open and closed app’' [Virtual, Mid] and “It was just 
out of interest to see what you were up to really because I’d 
never done anything like that before so it was quite fun to 
have a go with it.” [Financial, Mid]. This may also explain 
why Rotman et al. [40] do not report social normalising 
behaviour as a motivator of participants in citizen science 
experiments. 
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 
Building on our findings regarding norms and competition 
in the CTD study, we are now in a position to discuss 
implications for the design of crowdsourcing and citizen 
science systems. In presenting these implications we also 
draw on our review of norm theories and prior CSCW 
research. These implications should be viewed as tentative 
recommendations as this point. They can provide useful 
guidance for designers and are a worthwhile subject for 
further experimental validation. 
1. Designers should consider whether a crowdsourcing 
system requires cultivation of a set of exceptional 
performers to produce a small number of high quality 
results, or a broad community of “average” 
contributors. In the first case, competitive-gamification 
should be considered. In the latter case, normification 
may also provide an effective strategy for engagement. 
Some crowdsourcing systems (e.g. Foldit) aim to generate 
of a small number of high quality results, and require skill 
on the part of the participants, which may require time to 
develop. In this case it may be desirable to identify and 
maximise the contribution of key individuals. Here an 
explicitly competitive, indeed other-competitive, approach 
may be most appropriate, helping to filter out those who are 
less motivated or less able to contribute to the task, whilst 
motivating high performers to contribute further. Other 
crowdsourcing systems (e.g. CTD) involve relatively 
simple tasks, but require a large coverage. Here the 
objective of crowdsourcing is to maximise the overall 
output of the crowd, so a broad community, including a 
large number of average contributors, may be preferable. In 
such cases normification strategies should also be 
considered, as environments that emphasise competition 
may demotivate large parts of the overall crowd. 
2. Designers should consider the development of systems 
that combine gamification and normification to get the 
“best of both worlds” – but be aware that interactions 
between the two approaches can be negative. 
Building on our first point, there are many systems in which 
designers may want to combine gamification and 
normification. The aims in such a system may include: 
• Allow high performers to compete with each other in 
such a way that other participants are not demotivated. 
• Provide a mechanism that allows self-competition and 
normalising behaviour, without enforcing either. 
• Encourage a sense of engagement in a collective, 
meaningful endeavour, and reduce environmental cues 
that specifically emphasise competition. 
When combining competition and normification designers 
need to carefully consider how these strategies interact. Our 
results suggest that it may be fairly safe to mix self-
competitive elements (badges, goal setting, personal scores) 
with normifying information. Chen et al. [5] have also 
provided evidence that achievement oriented individuals 
will largely ignore normalising cues, so normalising 
information should not overly demotivate high performing, 
self-competitive people. Combining normification and 
other-competition is more risky, for several reasons. Firstly, 
our results suggest this combination will demotivate those 
who are not performing well. If feedback mechanisms in 
the system are poorly designed, this in turn can have the 
effect of dragging down the performance of those with 
strong normalising tendencies. Finally, over emphasis on 
other-competition may make contributory norms less 
salient, and so reduce the impact of normification strategies.   
Finally, evidence from Sukumaran [48] (in line with the 
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct) indicates that the 
design of a virtual environment can affect the expression of 
norms, suggesting that over emphasis on other-competition 
may make contributory norms less salient, thus reducing the 
impact of normification strategies.  
Overall, in a system combining competition and 
normification, competition should not be upfront in the 
system, should be easy to opt in and out of, and should be 
focused primarily on those who are already achieving 
strong results. Future version of the CTD system will reflect 
this advice. For example, by default the initial screen will 
display the total number of shops rated by the community, 
the average number of shops rated by each member over a 
given period, e.g. the last 7 days, and the number rated by 
the user in this time. A “contribution” screen will also be 
included. This will displays target numbers of ratings to be 
awarded a “bronze”, “silver” or “gold” contributor award 
for a given 7 day period, together with the user’s current 
score. To emphasise this is in recognition of contribution, 
not an achievement, the message accompanying successful 
completion would be phrased as a “Thank you” message, 
rather than “Congratulations!”. This will cater for those 
motivated by personal achievement, but will do so in a way 
that promotes a sense of contribution to a collective 
endeavour rather than winning over others. Finally, the app 
will include a “star contributors” screen that lists the scores 
of the top 10% of contributors. This will be accessible 
through an “opt-in” function. Once selected, the user can 
then set it as their default view. This will allow other-
competition between those at the top who “opt-in”, while 
reducing the potential to demotivate others. We hypothesise 
that this combination of competitive and normalising 
strategies will result in an overall improvement in the 
 performance of the community. However, we acknowledge 
that further research is necessary to investigate this 
hypothesis. 
3. Designers should carefully consider which of the norm 
types are most likely to encourage engagement in their 
user population and application context. 
The psychological theories of norm offer three different 
norm types – descriptive, injunctive, and personal – each of 
which has the potential to influence users positively or 
negatively. For example, Schultz and Nolan et al. [41] and 
Chen et al. [5] have found that descriptive norms can 
encourage low performing users to move towards the 
“typical” contribution level of a community. A potential 
disadvantage of descriptive norms, particularly in the early 
days of community development, is that the norm of 
contribution may not be high enough to sustain the 
community. If participants observe low levels of activity by 
other community members, it may have a demotivating 
effect. 
Depending on the social characteristics of a system, 
injunctive norms may also be an option. Normative Social 
Behaviour suggests that individuals are influenced both by 
seeking social approval of people important to them, and by 
the expected behaviour of the groups they identify with. By 
sharing identities of participants in a community rather than 
remaining anonymous, individuals may experience a 
stronger motivation to contribute, particularly if they know 
others in the community. However this decision will 
involve trade-offs against other concerns, e.g. how 
important is privacy in a given system. If participants come 
to consider the community owners as people from whom 
they want social approval, then the theory would suggest 
that highlighting the visibility of performance to the 
owners, together with gentle encouragement and messages 
of thanks, would enhance motivation. 
Finally, when personal norms are strongly held they can 
override the influence of other norms types, according to 
the Norm Activation Model. Those whose personal norms 
are aligned with the objectives of a crowdsourcing project 
are likely to be motivated to contribute beyond levels 
suggested by descriptive norm feedback. An environment 
can potentially be designed to appeal to those with a 
specific set of personal norms – perhaps leading to a 
reduced “pool” of recruits, but with higher levels of 
contributional commitment. 
4. Designers should consider alternate mechanisms to 
provide normifying feedback, both in terms of content 
and delivery modality. 
Research on the relative effectiveness of different 
approaches to providing norm feedback is at an early stage. 
Chen et al. [5] have used an email message stating an 
individual’s contribution and comparing it with the average 
contribution of others who are similar. Our leaderboard 
allowed individuals to view the ranked performance of all 
participants, which some used in a normifying way. (This 
was not our original intention.) These two approaches 
involved different degrees of subtlety and had differing 
effects on the users. A wide range of other approaches 
could be applied, for example: 
• Push messages of the form “Together we can <do the 
task>. Most participants contribute at least X ratings a 
week”. This wording draws on the findings of Schultz 
and Khazian et al. [42]. 
• Visualisations featuring contribution “bands” for a 
given period, including information on how many 
participants are in each band at a given time, and the 
participant’s current band.  
• Rather than focusing on individual comparison, a real-
time visualisation of collective progress towards a group 
target, together with some form of notification 
whenever others have made a contribution.  
Where injunctive norm feedback is used, important design 
decisions also are required regarding how explicitly this 
feedback is provided. For example, a participant’s 
contribution could be displayed in red when well below 
average, and shading to green as it reaches the average. A 
more explicit message such as “We would like you to 
contribute at least X ratings a week” could also be used.  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In many crowdsourcing and citizen science applications, the 
aim is to maximise the overall effectiveness of the crowd. 
In such situations, the motivating effect of competition on 
some may be outweighed by the demotivating effect it has 
on others. To that end, we have considered “normification” 
as an alternative design philosophy, aiming to encourage a 
sense of playing ones part in a collective effort. Whilst 
norm theories have influenced other areas of CSCW 
research, our review of crowdsourcing literature found little 
evidence of the use of norms as a design strategy. 
Our analysis of qualitative data from the CTD study 
provides initial evidence that some participants in 
crowdsourcing systems relate to comparative performance 
data in a normalising way, even when it is framed 
competitively as a “leaderboard”. These participants tend to 
be mid-range contributors. Such contributors can play a 
valuable role in increasing the overall effectiveness, and 
output, of crowdsourcing systems. In the case of the CTD 
study, we hypothesise that such people have a personal 
norm of sufficient contribution (as opposed to achieving 
more than others) and that the leaderboard allowed them to 
quantify what a sufficient contribution is, based on 
descriptive norms of others behaviour. However, with the 
leaderboard used in our system, we found evidence that 
normalising behaviour, interacting with the depressed 
scores from those demotivated by other-competition, lead to 
a reduction in the contribution of normalising participants. 
We believe more explicit norm strategies will increase the 
performance of normalising crowdsourcing participants. 
 In preparing this paper we are keenly aware of the ongoing 
debate within the HCI and CSCW communities regarding 
the role, and the gap between, theory and design-driven 
approaches [2, 19]. For example, Hekler et al. [19] have 
highlighted the role of differing experimental design 
strategies and the need for experimental validation of both 
theoretical predictions and new designs. We welcome this 
call. In the CTD study normification behaviour emerged 
somewhat accidentally. Research is now required to design 
and evaluate crowdsourcing systems that make more 
deliberate use of normification strategies. Two broad 
arguments presented in this paper are ripe for experimental 
examination: (1) that normification can improve the overall 
effectiveness of crowdsourcing systems, and (2) a 
combination of normification and competition will be most 
effective for systems requiring broad coverage, but not 
requiring high skill levels. These broad predictions, and the 
tentative design implications we have outlined, can also be 
examined at a more detailed level. For example, what are 
the most effective ways of combining normification and 
competition? Do opt-in strategies for competitive elements 
motivate people with strong competitive tendencies, whilst 
not demotivating others? Experiments can also be 
undertaken to investigate different types of norm feedback 
(e.g. text messages vs. visualisations, mean vs. individual 
scores), the effectiveness of subtle versus explicit injunctive 
feedback, and the impact of anonymity versus participant 
identification. 
Subject to this ongoing research, we believe normalisation 
will provide a powerful additional strategy for designers of 
crowdsourcing and citizen science systems. This paper 
provides initial answers and a starting point for new 
research in this area.  
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